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Will Increased Disclosure Help?
Evaluating the Recommendations of the ALI's
"Principles of the Law of Software Contracts"
Florencia Marotta-Wurglert
The aim of the American Law Institute's new Principles of the Law of Software
Contracts is to improve online contracting practices. Instead of regulating terms directly
to reduce the possibility of unfair or biased terms, the Principles emphasize increased
contract disclosure to encourage readership and comparison shopping. In this Article, I
test whether increasing disclosure in the proposed manner is likely to increase reader-
ship in the setting of end user license agreements (EULAs) of software sold online. I
follow the clickstreams of 47,399 households to 81 Internet software retailers and find
that EULAs are approximately 0.36 percent more likely to be viewed when they are
presented as clickwraps that explicitly require assent, as suggested by the Principles,
than when they are presented as browsewraps. The results indicate that mandating dis-
closure will not by itself change readership or contracting practices to a meaningful
degree. I briefly review other approaches to reform that may be more effective but come
with their own limitations.
Perhaps the most serious problem that deters reading in the soft-
ware retail context, singled out by many commentators and high-
lighted in litigation, is the manner of presenting terms.'
INTRODUCTION
The end user license agreements (EULAs) that attach to most
software products are controversial contracts. On the one hand, EU-
LAs allow software publishers to allocate rights and obligations associ-
ated with their products and educate consumers about intellectual
property rights.2 But others are concerned that transferors' widespread
use of shrinkwraps, licenses that can be seen only after a user purchases
the product, or browsewraps, licenses presented via hyperlinks at the
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1 ALI, Principles of the Law: Software Contracts 113 (2010) ("ALI Principles").
2 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz and Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass Market
Software License Agreements, 22 Rutgers Computer & Tech L J 335, 341-61 (1996); Robert W.
Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious about User-Friendly Mass Market Licensing for Software, 12 Geo
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bottom of transferors' web sites, may not effectively put transferees on
notice of the terms.' This lack of consumer awareness, some fear, allows
sellers to offer unfair terms that contractually extend intellectual pro-
tections beyond those afforded by federal intellectual property laws, for
example, and that limit liability for product failure.'
Not surprisingly, given these disparate viewpoints, there is cur-
rently no clear set of rules to govern software licenses. This uncertain-
ty is costly to both sellers and buyers. Addressing conflicting court
decisions and harmonizing the law of software contracts has proved
no easy task, however. Previous efforts such as Article 2B of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC) failed to obtain the approval of the
American Law Institute (ALI), and the Uniform Communications
Information Transactions Act (UCITA) was adopted only in Mary-
land and Virginia. These efforts were strongly opposed by many aca-
demics and consumer advocates due to a belief that the draft rules did
not sufficiently protect consumers.
The ALI has recently proposed a new approach in its Principles
of the Law of Software Contracts.' Unlike its predecessors, the draft-
ers of the Principles start from an explicit assumption that current
market forces alone are too weak to ensure that sellers offer terms
they consider fair to buyers. At least anecdotally, this assumption
seems reasonable in the mass-market retail context. When too few
buyers are sensitive to standard terms (that is, they fail to read them,
understand them, or care about them), there is no "informed minori-
ty" of comparison shoppers that will induce sellers to internalize buy-
ers' preferences. To the extent that sellers are not otherwise con-
strained by reputation or effective regulation, offering unfavorable
terms may be profit maximizing.
3 See, for example, Richard H. Stem, Shrink-Wrap Licenses of Mass Marketed Software:
Enforceable Contracts or Whistling in the Dark?, 11 Rutgers Computer & Tech L J 51, 55-56
(1985) (describing the idea of finding consent based on opening a package, as is done with
shrinkwrap licenses, as "unsettling" though likely the result of business realities); Batya Good-
man, Note, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap Agreement as an Adhe-
sion Contract, 21 Cardozo L Rev 319, 356-57 (1999) (arguing that shrinkwrap licenses should be
treated as adhesion contracts partially because many customers are unaware of the terms at the
time of purchase).
4 See, for example, J. Thomas Warlick IV, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing? Information Licens-
ing and De Facto Copyright Legislation in UCC 2B, 45 J Copyright Socy USA 158, 163-67 (1997).
5 See Michael Seringhaus, E-book Transactions: Amazon "Kindles" the Copy Ownership
Debate, 12 Yale J L & Tech 147, 164-65 (2009).
6 See generally ALI Principles (cited in note 1). For a more extensive discussion and
defense of the ALI's disclosure-focused approach in Software Contracts, see generally Robert A.
Hillman and Maureen O'Rourke, Defending Disclosure in Software Licensing, 78 U Chi L Rev
95 (2011).
7 See Alan Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect
Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U Pa L Rev 630, 649-51 (1979).
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The Principles' drafters emphasize the regulation of disclosure
rather than the regulation of terms. They anticipate that disclosure
will promote the emergence of an informed minority,' and it avoids
the intrusive and controversial nature of direct regulation of terms. In
particular, § 2.02, a provision providing safeguards for mass retail
transactions, includes a set of best practices for disclosure that ensures
enforcement of a seller's terms. To create a presumption of enforcea-
bility, one provision asks that software vendors, both online and
brick-and-mortar, post their license agreements in a "reasonably ac-
cessible" manner on the corporate website, regardless of whether they
sell software through that website.'" The Principles ask that terms be
conspicuously available via hyperlink before purchase "so that a
transferee cannot help but become aware of the terms."" Finally,
sellers who sell their software via their corporate websites are asked
to use clickwraps, which require buyers to click on "I agree" next to a
scroll box with the text of the license.12 If effective, this approach to
correcting market failure would seem superior to direct regulation.
If contract readership remains relatively unaffected by increased
disclosure, however, promoting increased disclosure would be ineffec-
tive and could even introduce new costs and inefficiencies. Courts
might be led to believe mistakenly that terms are the product of well-
working market mechanisms and be more lenient in policing abusive
terms." Alternatively, disclosure in the form of clickwraps might be
costly to sellers if the additional steps in the checkout process cause
some shoppers to lose patience. 4 Finally, these recommendations
could generate costly changes to current software seller disclosure
practices, because most contracts currently offered are either "pay
8 The Principles also include some mandatory terms, such as a nondisclaimable implied
warranty of no known material hidden defects. See ALI Principles § 3.05(b) at 193 (cited in
note 1). See also Hillman and O'Rourke, 78 U Chi L Rev at 95-96 (cited in note 6).
9 See ALI Principles § 2.02, comment c at 126-30 (cited in note 1). See also Hillman and
O'Rourke, 78 U Chi L Rev at 100 (cited in note 6).
to ALI Principles § 2.02(c)(1) at 126-28 (cited in note 1).
11 ALI Principles § 2.02, comment cat 128 (cited in note 1).
12 ALI Principles § 2.02, comment c at 129 (cited in note 1) (discussing the need for an
action of acceptance, such as clicking an icon, to make an online transaction enforceable).
13 See Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of
E-standard Terms Backfire?, 104 Mich L Rev 837, 853-55 (2006); Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth
of the "Opportunity to Read" in Contract Law, 5 Eur Rev Cont L 1, 13-21 (2009); Omri Ben-
Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure *57-62 (University of Chica-
go John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No 516, Mar 2010), online at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1567284 (visited Oct 20, 2010).
14 See Ronald J. Mann and Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet
Retail Contracting, 108 Colum L Rev 984, 998-1001 (2008).
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now, terms later" contracts (PNTLs) or browsewraps that users must
explore the website to find."
In this Article, I test the central presumption of the ALI's ap-
proach, namely that increased EULA disclosure will indeed lead to
increased readership. The current analysis, which concentrates on the
method of disclosure encouraged by the Principles, is drawn from a
more general study of the effectiveness of alternative disclosure tech-
niques.'6 I used clickstream data to track the visits of 47,399 house-
holds to the websites of eighty-one software retailers over a period of
one month. For each household in the panel, I tracked the exact se-
quence of page visits (URLs) to each software website, such as visits
to product pages, checkout pages, and pages that correspond to EU-
LAs. I also noted the time spent on each URL. For each software re-
tailer in the sample, I recorded whether the EULA was presented as a
clickwrap ("I agree") or a browsewrap.
The main finding is that an increase in contract accessibility does
not result in an economically significant increase in readership. Man-
dating assent by requiring consumers to agree to terms by clicking on
an "I agree" box next to the terms increases contract readership by at
best on the order of 1 percent. Averaging across six different esti-
mates of shoppers' readership rates, I estimate that clickwraps are
read only 0.36 percent more often than browsewraps, and the overall
average rate of readership of EULAs is on the order of 0.1 percent to
1 percent. This low average rate of readership is conservative in that I
assume that all shoppers who access a EULA page for at least one
second can be said to have read it, despite the fact that the average
EULA is 2,300 words long and written in complex language."
An increase in the shopper readership rate of 0.36 percent, from
a base rate of 1 percent or less, will not create an informed minority of
comparison shoppers. The clearest policy implication is that increased
disclosure is no panacea. Disclosure is but a necessary condition for
readership. It appears that the cost of accessing the contract is not the
issue; rather it is the expected benefit from reading it.
15 Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are "Pay Now, Terms Later" Contracts Worse for Buyers?
Evidence from Software License Agreements, 38 J Legal Stud 309, 321-23 & table 1 (2009) (find-
ing that in a sample of 515 EULAs, 52.2 percent were PNTLs).
16 See generally Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Disclosure Matter? (NYU Center for
Law, Economics and Organization Working Paper No 10-54, Nov 2010), online at
http://ssm.comlabstract=1713860 (visited Dec 21, 2010).
17 See Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, and David R. Trossen, Does Anyone
Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts *26
(NYU Center for Law, Economics and Organization Working Paper No 09-40, Oct 2009), online
at http://ssm.com/abstract=1443256 (visited Oct 22, 2010) (finding the average word count of 240
EULAs to be 2,277 words with a standard deviation of 1,148 words).
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Policymakers need to focus much more on changing consumers'
expectations about the net benefits of becoming informed. Shoppers
who know that the EULA exists but choose not to read it might do so
because they expect that contracts are too long and hard to under-
stand, too unlikely to become relevant in their use of the product, or
in any case address issues that are less important than product charac-
teristics such as price and function. Options available to policymakers
thus include reducing contract length, simplifying and standardizing
language, and developing ratings that would convey the essence of
terms with minimal effort." These changes might induce consumers to
become informed and comparison shop for products with more favor-
able terms. Direct regulation also remains an option of last resort, but
one that needs to remain on the table despite the Principles' drafters'
understandable apprehension. Realistically, even a suite of well-
designed changes to disclosure and presentation methods may be in-
sufficient to raise readership by the one to two orders of magnitude
needed to reach a rate that could plausibly support an informed mi-
nority equilibrium.
Furthermore, recent research suggests that the drafters' implicit
fear that firms that use PNTLs or shrinkwraps will take advantage of
delayed disclosure by offering particularly one-sided terms is misguid-
ed. A study of the terms offered by 515 software retailers who sell
their software online found that PNTL contracts were in no regard
more one-sided than those of sellers that disclosed their contracts pri-
or to purchase as browsewraps or clickwraps." If there is fear that
sellers are using poor disclosure to sneak in unusually unfavorable
terms, it is a fear that is currently not justified. Still, for the aforemen-
tioned reasons, the effect of disclosure on EULA readership is an im-
portant general question that needs to be addressed.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the perceived prob-
lems with EULAs and the Principles' approach to alleviating them.
Part II describes the methodology. Part III describes the main results.
Part IV discusses implications.
I. DISCLOSURE AS THE PRINCIPLES' MAIN APPROACH TO
PREVENTING MARKET FAILURE
The law governing software transactions is in disarray. During the
past two decades, courts have struggled with the contract and intellec-
tual property law issues presented by this new technology. In the ab-
sence of clear rules on the subject, courts have disagreed on a variety of
18 For a detailed discussion of the policy implications of these findings, see Part IV.
19 See Marotta-wurgler, 38 J Legal Stud at 333-37 & table 4 (cited in note 15).
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subjects, ranging from whether software should be classified as a good
under Article 2 of the UCCo to whether software publishers can use
EULAs to extend protections granted by intellectual property laws.21
One of the most contentious issues has been whether terms presented
after payment, generally in the form of shrinkwraps or PNTLs, where
buyers cannot see the terms of the contract until after purchase,
should become part of the agreement between the parties.' Similarly,
courts have struggled with whether browsewraps, in which sellers pre-
sent their terms via hyperlinks at the bottom of their corporate web
pages, present sufficient notice and "opportunity to read" before re-
quiring a manifestation of assent.' The conflicting case law that
emerged as a result of this has generated much uncertainty and has
increased the cost of doing business for both buyers and sellers alike.
As noted earlier, despite multiple attempts to harmonize the law
of software contracts, most proposals were unsuccessful. Article 2B of
the UCC failed to obtain the support of the ALI, mostly because it
was perceived as being too seller friendly.24 The proposed law then
became the UCITA, which was enacted only in Maryland and Virgin-
ia and was met with harsh criticism. One of the most serious objec-
tions to UCITA was that it embraces the enforcement of shrinkwraps
and PNTLs. Critics fear that sellers will take advantage of delayed
disclosure to include self-serving terms.'
20 See Micro Data Base Systems, Inc v Dharma Systems, Inc, 148 F3d 649, 654 (7th Cir 1998);
Advent Systems Ltd v Unisys Corp, 925 F2d 670,675-76 (3d Cir 1991). See also UCC § 2-105 (defin-
ing "goods" as "all things ... which are movable at the time of identification to the contract of sale").
21 See, for example, ProCD, Inc v Zeidenberg, 86 F3d 1447, 1453-55 (7th Cir 1996); Soft-
man Products Co v Adobe Systems Inc, 171 F Supp 2d 1075, 1089 (CD Cal 2001).
22 Compare Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc v Wyse Technology, 939 F2d 91, 98-105 (3d Cir
1991); Arizona Retail Systems, Inc v Software Link, Inc, 831 F Supp 759, 764-66 (D Ariz 1993),
with M.A. Mortenson Co v Timberline Software Corp, 998 P2d 305, 313 (Wash 2000).
23 See Ben-Shahar, 5 Eur Rev Cont L at 9-12 (cited in note 13) (describing and challeng-
ing court decisions and academic arguments that browsewrap licenses are not binding because of
a lack of consent).
24 See Jessica Litman, The Tales That Article 2B Tells, 13 Berkeley Tech L J 931, 939
(1998). See also Consumer Project on Technology, Protest Page on Uniform Commercial Code
Article 2B, online at http://www.cptech.org/ucc/ (visited Oct 22, 2010) (giving an overview of
Article 2B and compiling unfavorable literature).
25 See, for example, Jean Braucher, The Failed Promise of the UCITA Mass-Market Concept
and Its Lessons for Policing of Standard Form Contracts, 7 Lewis & Clark J Small & Emerging Bus
L 393, 396 (2003); Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-commerce as an Unfair and
Deceptive Practice, 46 Wayne L Rev 1805, 1841-42 (2000); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption:
The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 Cal L Rev 111, 122 (1999); Americans for
Fair Electronic Commerce Transactions, Why We Opposed UCITA, online at
http://www.ucita.com/why.htmi (visited Oct 22, 2010) (citing the seller-friendly implications of the
law). But see Marotta-Wurgler, 38 J Legal Stud at 333 (cited in note 15) (presenting evidence show-
ing that PNTLs include no less consumer friendly terms). More recently, critics have focused on
proposed amendments to Article 2 of the UCC, which explicitly exclude information goods from
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In May 2009, the ALI approved the Principles of the Law of
Software Contracts. One of the Principles' biggest deviations from
UCITA regards contract formation. The Principles reject delayed or
nonconspicuous contract disclosure as an acceptable contract for-
mation mechanism due to a belief that this might contribute to low
contract readership and prevent the creation of an informed minority
of shoppers.' Recent research has shown that this concern is indeed
legitimate. In a recent large-sample study examining the online shop-
ping behavior of consumers to sixty-six software companies, Yannis
Bakos, David R. Trossen, and I found that that only about 1 in 1,000
shoppers chose to read the fine print and that this number was insuffi-
cient to constitute an informed minority.'
To address this problem, the drafters embraced a regime that fo-
cuses on disclosure.' The hope is that increased disclosure will help
create an informed minority of consumers as well as make it easier for
watchdog groups to access terms and spread the word about unsavory
provisions. Sellers who wish to maintain their reputations and level of
sales will thus respond to increased scrutiny by offering more desira-
ble terms.' The relevant provision is § 2.02, which provides safeguards
for mass-market retail transactions by outlining a series of seller "best
practices" with respect to disclosure that, if followed, ensure enforce-
ment of a seller's terms.
Specifically, the Principles ask that software vendors, both online
and brick-and-mortar, post the terms of their license agreements in a
"reasonably accessible" manner on their websites." To comply with
this provision, sellers who offer physical copies of software and
shrinkwrap their EULAs must establish an online presence."
its scope. The fear is that courts currently relying on Article 2 of the UCC to address software
licensing issues will turn to UCITA for guidance.
26 See ALI Principles at 112-16 (cited in note 1) (determining that market forces were not
enough to prevent "unsavory terms," partially because current licensing practices inform an
insufficient number of consumers). Consider also Robert A. Hillman, Online Consumer Stand-
ard Form Contracting Practices: A Survey and Discussion of Legal Implications, in Jane K. Winn,
ed, Consumer Protection in the Age of the "Information Economy" 283, 291-92 (Ashgate 2006).
27 See Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, and Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? at *36-37
(cited in note 17).
28 See ALI Principles § 2.02, comment e at 131-32 (cited in note 1).
29 ALl Principles § 2.02, comment e at 131-32 (cited in note 1).
30 ALI Principles § 2.02(c)(1) at 121 (cited in note 1) ("A transferee will be deemed to
have adopted a standard form as a contract if the standard form is reasonably accessible elec-
tronically prior to the initiation of the transfer at issue."). The comments state that "transferors
should adopt the best practices of subsection (c) to ensure enforcement of the form." ALI Prin-
ciples § 2.02, comment b at 124 (cited in note 1). Even terms that comply with § 2.02(c)(1), how-
ever, would be subject to a claim that the terms are unconscionable or against public policy. See
ALI Principles § 2.02, comment b at 124 (cited in note 1).
31 See ALI Principles § 2.02, comment c at 127-28 (cited in note 1). The Principles ask that
notice and availability of terms be conspicuously available via a hyperlink before purchase and
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While these new rules will certainly affect the business practices
of brick-and-mortar retailers, it is e-commerce practices that will be
most affected. Subsection 2.02(c)(3) prescribes that sellers who sell
their software through their corporate websites must use clickwraps.32
Specifically, to be enforceable, buyers must click on an "I agree" icon
next to a scroll box containing the text of the license. The drafters
note that "[tIhis form of clickwrap closely resembles traditional modes
of agreeing to paper standard forms."" Since it is cheap to change a
browsewrap into a clickwrap, the drafters reason that this change
should not be controversial. The drafters note that unless a transferee
is familiar with the terms due to previous dealings, terms presented in
a browsewrap format would not constitute sufficient notice.M
If this form of disclosure succeeds in increasing the number of in-
formed consumers, then it is clearly superior to other, more intrusive
alternatives that might be costlier to implement. For the reasons noted
earlier, however, if contract readership remains unaffected by these
new rules, then adopting a regime of increased disclosure could be
potentially harmful.
Increased disclosure regimes have been broadly criticized for be-
ing ineffective. For instance, Omri Ben-Shahar argues that disclosure
regulations that seek to increase the opportunity to read contracts are
unlikely to have any effect on consumer behavior, because consumers
generally ignore fine print, regardless of how accessible it is.' Ben-
Shahar and Carl E. Schneider report how mandatory disclosure re-
gimes have failed in a variety of contexts and advocate abandoning
this form of regulation.' And in earlier work, I found that making
contracts more accessible on the web by reducing the number of
that the transferee "signify agreement at the end of or adjacent to an e-standard form or, in the
case of a standard form printed on or attached to a package ... must fail to exercise the oppor-
tunity to return the packaged software unopened ... within a reasonable time." ALI Principles
§ 2.02, comment c at 127 (cited in note 1).
32 See ALI Principles § 2.02(c)(3) at 121 (cited in note 1). The relevant provision states
that "in the case of an electronic transfer of software, the transferee signifies agreement at the
end of or adjacent to the electronic standard form."
33 ALI Principles § 2.02, comment c at 129 (cited in note 1). They also explain that
"[u]nder subsection (c)(3), a mere screen reference to terms that can be found somewhere else
on the site would be insufficient as would a scroll-down window containing the standard form if
the 'I agree' icon is not at the end of or adjacent to the standard form." ALI Principles § 2.02,
comment c at 129 (cited in note 1).
3 ALI Principles § 2.02, comment b at 124 (cited in note 1).
35 See Ben-Shahar, 5 Eur Rev Cont L at 5 (cited in note 13).
36 Ben-Shahar and Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure at *54-66 (cited in note 13).
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mouse clicks it takes to access them does not affect contract reader-
ship in any significant way."
Despite the possible shortcomings of disclosure regimes, the
drafters defend their approach by arguing that even if it does not
work, increasing disclosure is arguably a cheap solution that, unlike
more intrusive alternatives, is unlikely to create any distortions.' They
also suggest that because business users are more likely to read dis-
closed terms, disclosure might help that subset of buyers. Finally, pre-
senting consumers with an opportunity to read supports Karl Llewel-
lyn's idea of individual assent and autonomy, even if most consumers
do not read." If adopted by courts, the Principles will affect the way
buyers and sellers contract online for years to come. It is thus im-
portant to test whether the Principles' recommendations will succeed
in increasing the number of informed consumers and in creating an
informed minority of shoppers capable of disciplining sellers. This
Article provides empirical evidence on this question.
II. AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE PRINCIPLES' APPROACH
To assess whether increased EULA disclosure increases reader-
ship, I studied the browsing and shopping behavior of online consum-
ers of eighty-one software retailers who sell their products through
their corporate websites and who also make their EULAs available
somewhere on their sites. I measured the proportion of shoppers, var-
iously defined, who chose to become informed about the EULAs that
govern the featured software as a function of whether they are pre-
sented as clickwraps or browsewraps.
A. Data and Sample Construction
This Article uses the clickstream data set introduced by Bakos,
Marotta-Wurgler, and Trossen. These data track the Internet brows-
ing behavior of 92,411 US households during January 2007 and were
collected by a major online research company that tracks the brows-
ing behavior of a representative panel of US households.' Each
browsing "session" captured whether the household member initiated
37 Marotta-Wurgler, Does Disclosure Matter? at *4 (cited in note 16) (noting that
subtracting one mouse click from the number of clicks it takes to reach the contract increases
readership by only 0.05 percent).
38 ALI Principles § 2.02, comment h at 134 (cited in note 1).
39 ALI Principles § 2.02, comment h at 134 (cited in note 1) (noting that the amount of
information disclosure will most likely overload readers but arguing that reputational concerns
will help regulate transferor's terms even if readership does not increase).
4 For a detailed description of the data collection process, see Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler,
and Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? at *17-18 (cited in note 17).
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a secure (that is, encrypted) connection, and each website visited has a
unique identifier for the company or division that owns that web server.
The data also contain demographic information about the household.
The sample of browsing sessions under study includes only visits
to online software retailers that sell their products on their corporate
websites and that make their contracts available somewhere on the
sites before or during the checkout process.41 The sample excludes
freeware providers, peer-to-peer software providers, web hosting
companies, and companies that do not sell their software through
their corporate websites. The sample also excludes firms with fewer
than fifty unique visitors who visited at least two pages in a given
month. Ultimately, 47,399 households contributed to the sample by
participating in at least one session that satisfied these criteria during
the sample period, and collectively these households visited eighty-
one different software retailers.42
I collected all of the URLs that correspond to EULAs available
on each seller's website. I also collected company and product infor-
mation that might affect a shopper's propensity to become informed
about EULA terms. As reported in Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, and
Trossen, the average revenue of the eighty-one sample companies was
$1.52 billion and the median was $6 million. The average age of these
companies since incorporation was 16.7 years (the median was 14).
Regarding product characteristics, which might also affect the demand
to learn about EULA terms, the average of the median prices for the
products offered on each website was $352, and the median of those
prices was $49. Sixty-eight percent of the sample products for which I
gathered EULAs were targeted to consumers or home offices as op-
posed to larger firms. The products were spread across software cate-
gories (for example, spreadsheet, antivirus, and so on)."
B. Contract Accessibility
To measure contract accessibility and disclosure, I collected all of
the EULA URLs available on the companies' websites. Some companies
offered only one product and posted the EULA for that product.
41 See Marotta-wurgler, Does Disclosure Matter? at *13-15 (cited in note 16) (describing
the method used to select companies and describing their general charecteristics).
42 Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, and Trossen used a sample of fifty-six retail and ten freeware
companies. The companies in this sample included all fifty-six retailers studied in that paper as
well as twenty-five additional companies. The latter were not part of the original sample because
shoppers are presented with the EULAs during the checkout process, thus preventing us from
measuring shoppers' intent to become informed about terms voluntarily.
43 For additional detail on the sample companies and households, see Bakos, Marotta-
Wurgler, and Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? at *20-21, 24-25 (cited in note 17).
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Most companies offered several products. Some used the same EULA
for all of their products, and others had different EULAs for each
product, including present and past versions. I recorded every EULA
posted. There are 240 unique URLs corresponding to EULAs for our
sample companies.
The Principles distinguish between clickwraps and browsewraps.
For each firm in the sample, I recorded in which of these two basic
manners EULAs were disclosed." Clickwraps can be further subdivid-
ed into two types. In one type, the buyer is asked to acknowledge the
EULA by clicking "I agree" below a scroll box that contains the terms.
As noted earlier, this is the type of clickwrap that the drafters would
deem enforceable.' Most sellers that use clickwraps do so in a slightly
different way. They also ask the buyer to click "I agree," but they re-
quire another click on a nearby hyperlink entitled "End User License
Agreement" before the contract is presented. Other companies in the
sample make their contracts available on their websites but require
buyers to voluntarily seek them out. They may locate these browse-
wraps one or more clicks away from the natural path of purchase.
The distribution of contract accessibility by company is reported in
Table 1. A total of twenty-five firms, or about 31 percent of the firms in
the sample, use clickwraps. Of these, three are of the scroll box type
and twenty-two are of the hyperlink type described above. The remain-
ing fifty-six firms use browsewraps to present EULA terms.
TABLE 1. EULA LOCATION SUMMARY STATISTICS:
BROWSEWRAPS VERSUS CLICKWRAPS




Note: Browsewraps are contracts presented as hyperlinks on sellers' web pages that gen-
erally require one or more clicks to access from the main page. Clickwraps are contracts
presented next to boxes with "I agree" icons next to them that consumers must click on
to continue with a particular transaction.
44 For a more nuanced study of increased contract accessibility on readership, see Marotta-
Wurgler, Does Disclosure Matter? at *18-26 (cited in note 16). That paper measures contract
accessibility as the number of mouse clicks it takes to access the EULA from the most natural
path to purchase, from zero to up to six clicks away.
45 See note 33 and accompanying text.
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1. Shoppers and shopping visits.
Our data set includes the Internet browsing activity of all panel
visitors to the sample companies. But people access software retailers'
corporate websites for reasons other than shopping. For example,
some are looking for a patch to fix a problem with software that they
already own, others are looking to download a new update, others are
looking for quarterly financial statements, and so on. I thus needed to
identify those visitors who were shoppers in the sense that they were
potentially interested in buying a product.
I followed the approach in the Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, and
Trossen study to identify shopping-oriented visits, which I discuss
briefly below. I attempted to exclude visits that did not access compa-
ny servers dedicated to shopping or purchasing activities. I defined a
"company visit" as all page views (URL accesses) from a company's
website within a single user session. I adopted the approach widely
used in the clickstream literature by identifying shopping visits based
on the intensity of the company visit. Previous research has found that
the more pages a user visits on a retailer's site, the more likely the
user is to be a shopper.6
The first task was to define a company visit. Shopping over the
Internet can be different from shopping at brick-and-mortar stores.
Internet shoppers can visit a company multiple times at any time of
the day from their own homes with just a few mouse clicks. Indeed,
researchers have found that shoppers tend to visit a store repeatedly
within a month while contemplating a single purchase." I used two
definitions of a company visit. The narrowest was that used by the
data provider and some articles in the literature, and it considers a
single visit as a period of web-browsing activity separated by at least
thirty minutes of inactivity.' A user can have multiple visits over a day
or several days. The broadest definition takes into consideration the
possibility that a shopper may visit a company on multiple occasions,
over the span of several days, before deciding for or against a purchase.
For this definition of a company visit, I aggregated the number of visits
to a unique company in a given month. The goal was to establish a
46 See, for example, Wendy W. Moe and Peter S. Fader, Dynamic Conversion Behavior at
E-commerce Sites, 50 Mgmt Sci 326, 328 (2004). For a detailed account and a list of sources, see
Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, and Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? at *21-23 & nf 57-59
(cited in note 17).
47 Eric J. Johnson, et al, On the Depth and Dynamics of Online Search Behavior, 50 Mgmt
Sci 299, 301 n 2 (2004) (finding that less than 1 percent of all month-long sessions in their sample
contained more than one purchasing transaction with a given company).
48 See, for example, Moe and Fader, 50 Mgmt Sci at 331-32 (cited in note 46).
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range such that the typical shopping visit would lie somewhere in the
middle of these two definitions.
The second task was to determine which company visits can be
considered shopping visits. I used three definitions of a shopping visit.
The broadest was a visit to at least two pages of the given company's
website. The more restrictive definition required at least five page
views. This is more likely to exclude casual browsers, but is still broad.
The most restrictive definition of "shopper" is one that includes only
those visitors who have actually selected a product and initiated a
checkout or payment in a given session. Starting a checkout process
indicates that a transaction was at least contemplated, even if in a few
cases the purchase was ultimately not completed. This last definition
of "shopping visit" captures only serious shoppers but is overly re-
strictive, as it excludes shopping visits that might have resulted in a
purchase but did not. Given that there is no perfect way to identify
shoppers with the data available, these three definitions can again be
viewed as providing some upper and lower bounds on the number of
shopping-oriented visits.
2. Reading.
Obviously, we can observe only whether a given page was visited,
not whether its content was read or understood. I defined readership
as remaining on the URL that contained a EULA for at least one sec-
ond. This is conservative in that it certainly overcounts the effective
rate of readership. That is, this measure gives the informed minority
hypothesis the strongest benefit of the doubt. The typical EULA is
thousands of words long and cannot be read in one or even several
seconds. Furthermore, some of the EULA page clicks may be acci-
dental, or the browser may be looking for other information that is by
chance also on the page that contains the EULA.
III. ARE CLICKWRAPS MORE LIKELY TO BE READ
THAN BROWSEWRAPS?
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the characteristics of visits to compa-
nies that present their terms as clickwraps of the hyperlink type or as
browsewraps. This analysis excludes visits to the three companies with
clickwraps of the scroll box type-the precise form of clickwrap pre-
ferred by the ALI-because all shoppers who begin the checkout pro-
cess are automatically presented with the text of the EULA. This pre-
vents us from observing the voluntary readership rate. I address visits
to these companies separately.
Table 2 measures visits as uninterrupted sessions and Table 3
measures visits by unique users, aggregating all of the monthly sessions.
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Each table presents data for each definition of a shopping visit. I re-
port the number of such visits to companies with clickwraps and
browsewraps and the average and median number of page views. I
also report the number of visits in which the shopper accessed a
EULA as well as the average and median length of time spent on the
EULA URL when it was accessed.
The top panel of Table 2 looks at uninterrupted visits by visitors
who clicked on at least two pages during a company visit. There were
11,184 visits to companies that make their contracts available via a
clickwrap, including repeat visits. The average and median numbers of
pages viewed during these visits are nine and four, respectively. Yet of
all of these thousands of visits, only eight (or 0.07 percent) included
EULA access.
This is not much of an improvement over the readership rate of
browsewraps. There were 120,545 visits to companies that use
browsewraps, and the average and median numbers of pages viewed
at those companies are twelve and five, respectively. The total num-
ber of EULA visits for these companies was 40 out of 120,545, or
0.03 percent of all visits. While the observed low readership rate here
of browsewraps is consistent with the Principles' view that they might
provide insufficient notice or be too hard to find, the fact that the
readership rate of clickwraps is also virtually nil suggests that access is
not the fundamental constraint on readership.
The last columns summarize the time spent on the EULA URL
when it was accessed. The median time spent on EULAs as click-
wraps was sixty-one seconds and the median for browsewraps was
thirty seconds. As noted in the Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, and Trossen
study, the average EULA length is about 2,300 words long. Given the
time spent on these contracts, it is unlikely that shoppers became
meaningfully informed after having accessed them. Not only are very
few shoppers choosing to read the terms, but those who do read them
often do not take the time required to fully understand them.'
When a shopping visit is defined more strictly, as a visit in which
at least five pages in a company website were accessed, the picture is
similar. The readership rate of EULAs approximately doubles for
both clickwraps and browsewraps, but it remains miniscule in both
cases, at under 0.2 percent.
The bottom panel of Table 2 considers visits in which the shopper
actually initiated a checkout process. In this case, we can be sure that
the visitors were serious shoppers. Here all of the visitors to clickwrap
49 The data cannot track whether consumers saved or printed the terms. If that were the
case, then the time spent on a EULA would not reflect the time spent reading it.
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EULA sites are aware of the license because the checkout process
required them to agree explicitly to it. Still, only 2 out of 381 shoppers
chose to actually view the license. This suggests that increased disclo-
sure may simply be unable to induce shoppers to study terms, even
when they are being required to confirm their assent.
TABLE 2. CLICKWRAPS VERSUS BROWSEWRAPS:
VISITS MEASURED AS UNINTERRUPTED SESSIONS
Contract N of Mean N Median N N of Mean Median
accessibility company of pg. acc. of pg. acc. EULA length of length of
visits per com- per com- visits EULA EULA
pany visit pany visit (% of access in access in
(s.d.) company seconds seconds
visits) (s.d.)
Panel A. At Least 2 Pages Accessed during Visit
Clickwrap 11,184 8.5 4 8 139.6 61
(23.6) (0.07) (223.8)
Browsewrap 120,545 12.4 5 40 46.9 29.5
(26.9) (0.03) (43.1)
Panel B. At Least 5 Pages Accessed during Visit
Clickwrap 4,513 17.1 9 7 150.4 58
(35.4) (0.16) (239.5)
Browsewrap 67,769 19.9 10 37 46.8 29
(34.0) (0.05) (44.74)
Panel C. At Least 1 Secure Checkout Page Accessed during Visit
Clickwrap 381 13.7 6 2 372 372
(30.8) (0.52) (444.1)
Browsewrap 4,485 13.11 5 4 90 76.5
(30.6) (0.09) (68.1)
Note: Summary statistics of visits to companies with clickwraps and browsewraps, measured as uninterrupted
sessions. Results are presented for three different definitions of a visit: two or more pages accessed, five or
more pages accessed, and visits where a shopper placed a product in a shopping cart and began a secure
checkout process. The first column indicates contract accessibility, measured as either a browsewrap or a
clickwrap. The second column reports the number of visits to companies according to their contract accessibil-
ity. The third and fourth columns report the average and median number of pages visited during a company
visit. The fifth reports the number of visits in which the visitor accessed a EULA. The remaining columns
report the average and median time spent on the EULA.
Table 3 aggregates all monthly sessions of an individual user into
single company visits. The results are similar to those in Table 2. For all
cases, the total number of visits is reduced because multiple visits by
individual users are combined. The overall results of Table 3, however,
indicate that the general impressions from Table 2 do not depend on
the precise definition of company visits. The very highest fraction of
readers among retail shoppers across all shopper and session definitions
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is 1.46 percent. Only 3 out of the total of 205 buyers who were forced
to acknowledge the EULA actually read it.'
TABLE 3. CLICKWRAPS VERSUS BROWSEWRAPS:
VISITS MEASURED AS MONTHLY AGGREGATES
Contract N of com- Mean N of Median N N of Mean Median
accessibility pany visits pg. acc. of pg. aec. EULA length of length of
per com- per com- visits EULA EULA
pany visit pany visit (% of access in access in
(s.d.) company seconds seconds
visits) (s.d.)
Panel A. At Least 2 Pages Accessed during Visit
Clickwrap 6,100 15.6 4 8 139.6 61
(57) (0.13) (223.8)
Browse- 63,272 23.66 7 39 51.4 30
wrap (79.3) (0.06) (45.7)
Panel B. At Least 5 Pages Accessed during Visit
Clickwrap 3,011 29.0 11 7 150.4 58
(79.0) (0.23) (239.5)
Browse- 40,697 35.3 14 36 49.5 29.5
wrap (96.9) (0.09) (45.5)
Panel C. At Least 1 Secure Checkout Page Accessed during Visit
Clickwrap 205 79.7 27 3 283.3 106
(165.9) (1.46) (349.5)
Browse- 2,786 34.0 10 4 90 76.5
wrap (79.1) (0.14) (68.1)
Note: Summary statistics of visits to companies with clickwraps and browsewraps, measured as monthly aggre-
gates. Results are presented for three different definitions of a visit: two or more pages accessed, five or more
pages accessed, and visits where a shopper placed a product in a shopping cart and began a secure checkout
process. The first column indicates contract accessibility, measured as either a browsewrap or a clickwrap. The
second column reports the number of visits to companies according to their contract accessibility. The third
and fourth columns report the average and median number of pages visited during a company visit. The fifth
reports the number of visits in which the visitor accessed a EULA. The remaining columns report the average
and median time spent on the EULA.
Tables 2 and 3 contain six distinct estimates of the effect of man-
dating disclosure on the readership rate. In the first panel of Table 2,
the increase is 0.04 percent (0.07 percent minus 0.03 percent), for ex-
ample. Some of these are more likely to approach lower bounds and
others more likely to represent upper bounds. Averaging across the six
50 The issue is not one of sample size. The asymptotic standard error of the mean of the
binomial distribution is (p x (1 -p)/n)6. Inserting p = 0.0146 and n = 205 gives an estimate of the
standard error of 0.008. Roughly speaking, the 95 percent confidence interval for the estimated
readership rate is 0.0146 t 1.96 x 0.008, or 0 to 0.03-that is, 0 percent to 3 percent.
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estimates yields 0.36 percent, but in any case the range is narrow in
absolute terms.
These results raise serious doubts about whether disclosure will,
or even can, have an impact on readership as substantial as that envi-
sioned by the drafters of the Principles. There is one more category of
disclosure to examine, however, which includes the very best-
disclosed EULAs-clickwraps of the scroll box type. These contracts
are presented in a scroll box next to the "I agree" icon and do not ask
consumers even to click on a single link. Because all shoppers who
decide to purchase a product are presented with the text of the EULA
regardless of their interest in reading it, I can measure only the time
spent on these pages to assess shoppers' true interest level. In inter-
preting the time spent on these pages, one must consider that these
companies also require the shopper to enter his name, billing address,
and credit card information on the same page on which the EULA
text appears."
For uninterrupted sessions, there were 7,296 (unreported) visits to
these firms under the broadest definition of shopping visit. Of these,
523 (or 7.13 percent) involved accessing a EULA. The best way to
interpret this result is that 7.13 percent of those visiting these compa-
nies started a checkout process. The average time spent on the page
containing the EULA was 117 seconds, and the median was 65 sec-
onds. Given that these companies require shoppers to enter personal
information as well as agree to a lengthy EULA, most of the time
spent on this page was not spent reading the EULA text. More pre-
cisely, if the average EULA is 2,300 words long and the average adult
reading rate of non-legalese is 250 to 300 words per minute, then the
shopper needs 10 minutes just to read the full contract, leaving aside
the other tasks required on the page. The results are similar under
other definitions of shopping and company visits. Of all combinations
of definitions, the highest median time spent on the EULA-containing
page was ninety-four seconds. Moreover, I found in earlier work that
even those few consumers who read are not swayed by what they read
in making their purchase decisions.52
In unreported logistic regressions, I regressed the probability that a
EULA will be read on contract accessibility and controlled for compa-
ny, product, and shopper characteristics." I find that mandating assent
51 This varies by firm. Some firms require shoppers to enter their names and addresses on
the EULA page, while others require that shoppers enter their credit card information.
52 See Marotta-wurgler, Does Disclosure Matter? at *27-29 (cited in note 16) (finding that
the likelihood of purchase is not affected by the number of terms that favor the seller).
53 Complete product controls include whether the product is offered on a subscription
basis, the natural log of the median product price, whether the product is targeted to business or
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has, if anything, a small and statistically significant negative effect on
contract readership (0.2 percent at the 5 percent level of significance)
in the case of the two broader definitions of shopping visits.' In the
case of secured checkouts, mandating assent increases readership by a
statistically insignificant 0.7 percent. The results hold even after con-
sidering that some products, such as Microsoft Office, may be repeat
purchases and thus their EULAs are less likely to be read."
Although common sense suggests that such marginal increases in
readership rates are too small to induce an informed minority equilib-
rium in which comparison shopping effectively polices terms, this can
be demonstrated more quantitatively. Disregarding the impact of con-
trol variables, which as just noted diminishes the overall higher read-
ership rate associated with clickwraps, the highest fraction of EULA
accesses in our sample was found in the monthly aggregated sessions
of shoppers who initiated a checkout session. Even among these most
serious shoppers, the fraction of EULA access was under 1.5 percent
(3 out of 205). Using estimates for the requisite size of the informed
minority from the Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, and Trossen study, I find
that even this number is too small to discipline sellers into offering
desirable terms.
The general conclusion is clear: no matter how prominently
EULAs are disclosed, they are almost always ignored.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Disclosure regimes have long been the preferred approach to ad-
dress problems stemming from imperfect information in a range of
consumer contexts. The Principles follow this tradition and recom-
mend increased disclosure as a device to increase readership and
consumer end users, and whether the product is offered with a trial version. Company controls
include the natural log of revenue, whether the company is publicly traded, and the natural log
of age. Shopper controls include gender, the natural log of age, and the natural log of income.
54 For a more nuanced study of the effects of contract accessibility on readership, see
Marotta-Wurgler, Does Disclosure Matter? at *20 (cited in note 16) (finding that increased con-
tract access-that is, lower number of mouse clicks it takes to access the contract-is indeed
associated with increased readership, but that the total number of readers is extremely small).
55 See Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, and Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? at *20-21,
35-36 (cited in note 17). As in that paper, I checked whether shoppers are less likely to read the
EULAs of products that were, in my judgment, more likely to be purchased repeatedly. Users
that become familiar with a product that is continuously updated may feel less need to concern
themselves with the EULA. Other products, such as test preparation software, are less likely to
be purchased repeatedly. I created a dummy variable that equals 1 if the company marketed
products that were, in our judgment, likely to be repeat purchases. I found no relationship be-
tween the nature of the use of the software and users' propensity to access EULAs.
56 For a thorough analysis finding that EULAs have little impact on consumer behavior,
see Marotta-Wurgler, Does Disclosure Matter? at *29-31 (cited in note 16).
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comparison shopping for standard terms. This Article evaluates
whether this recommendation is likely to work.
Using the clickstream data of tens of thousands of households for
a period of one month, I found that clickwraps are not read at signifi-
cantly higher rates. Depending on the methodology, I estimate that
moving from browsewraps to clickwraps would increase shoppers'
readership rates by 0.04 percent to 1.32 percent relative to a baseline
readership rate of around 0 percent. An average estimate of the effect
across six methodologies is 0.36 percent. Put differently, switching to
clickwraps would be expected to generate 1 more reader out of every
278 shoppers. I also find that the time spent on EULA URLs, even
when they are accessed, is usually too small to allow for more than a
cursory review. These findings suggest that the Principles' goal of in-
creasing disclosure to alleviate possible market failures will not in-
crease readership or economic pressure on sellers.
It is also worth noting that there is evidence indicating that de-
layed or reduced contract disclosure is not associated with more pro-
seller terms. Recent evidence shows that the terms of sellers that use
PNTLs are no more one-sided than those of sellers that disclosed their
contracts on their sites in the form of browsewraps or clickwraps."
This suggests that sellers are not using delayed or inconspicuous dis-
closure to sneak in particularly unfavorable terms.
An argument made in favor of disclosure is that even if it does
not increase readership, it honors contract law's "opportunity to read"
and protects individual autonomy." Another is that pressure to in-
crease disclosure might encourage reputationally constrained sellers
to offer reasonable terms. The problem with these positions is that
these relatively intangible benefits need to be weighed against the real
costs of changing policy.
There are a number of such costs. Some are direct costs to sellers. In
my sample, only three out of eighty-one sellers currently use clickwraps
of the specific type recommended by the Principles. A related cost is the
lost business as a result of complicating the checkout process."
Other costs are hidden but potentially more significant. There is
a possible opportunity cost insofar as ineffective change forestalls real
change. Once a regulation is in place, it might take decades to revise
its effectiveness and implement a new approach.' In the meantime,
57 Marotta-Wurgler, 38 J Legal Stud at 333-37 & table 4 (cited in note 15).
58 See ALI Principles § 2.02, comment eat 132 (cited in note 1).
59 See Mann and Siebeneicher, 108 Colum L Rev at 1000 & n 57 (cited in note 14).
60 The Truth in Lending Act, 15 USC § 1601 et seq, has been criticized on these grounds.
See, for example, FTC, Improving Consumer Mortgage Disclosures: An Empirical Assessment of
Current and Prototype Disclosure Forms 2-7 (June 2007), online at http://www.ftc.gov/
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the mere appearance of a new policy embraced by authorities might
induce courts to be more lax about policing terms, to the extent that
they are lulled into thinking that terms are now the product of a well-
functioning market." As noted earlier, this concern is also shared by
the drafters of the Principles.62
It is important to be precise about the policy implications of these
findings. I do not provide any evidence regarding whether EULA
terms are indeed too unfavorable to the consumer -whether they are
one-sided to a degree that buyers would take note if they were made
to understand them. Sellers could be constrained by reputation or the
fear of litigation and could be writing reasonable contracts in most
cases. What I show is that if there are inefficiencies in this market,
then increased disclosure alone cannot be counted upon to make a
difference, and it is dangerous to believe otherwise.
The evidence here also implicitly offers guidance on which types of
intervention might be more effective in increasing economic pressure
on sellers. Given the low readership rates regardless of accessibility, the
problem appears to involve the expected net benefits to readership.
Many EULAs are too long and complicated for one to rationally take
the time to read, especially when they govern the use of moderately
priced products. Several consumer watchdog groups maintain websites
that identify EULAs with onerous terms.' Unfortunately, Bakos, Ma-
rotta-Wurgler, and Trossen find that very few people access these web-
sites either.' There is even a program that users can install for free that
screens EULA terms and alerts consumers of possible pitfalls, but
most software shoppers are not aware of it.65
os/2007/06/PO25505MortgageDisclosureReport.pdf (visited Oct 22,2010). See also Ben-Shahar and
Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure at *15-16 (cited in note 13).
61 See Hillman, 104 Mich L Rev at 853-55 (cited in note 13); Ben-Shahar and Schneider,
The Failure of Mandated Disclosure at *59-60 (cited in note 13).
62 See note 13 and accompanying text.
63 See, for example, Electronic Frontier Foundation, The Terms-of-Service Tracker, online
at http://www.tosback.org/timeline.php (visited Oct 22, 2010) (tracking and publishing changes in
the EULAs of fifty-six prominent online retailers); Andy Sternberg, The Small Print Project,
online at http://smallprint.netzoo.net/ (visited Oct 22, 2010) (maintaining a blog on EULA
changes that could be unfavorable to consumers); Ars Technica, Tech Policy, online at
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy (visited Oct 22, 2010) (reporting on recent changes in Internet
and technology policy including newsworthy changes in industry EULA policies).
6 Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, and Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? at *33-34
(cited in note 17) (finding that in a large sample of shoppers, none visited a web page with in-
formation about EULAs). See also Marotta-Wurgler, Does Disclosure Matter? at *26 (cited in
note 16) (arguing that even if consumers accessed EULA watchdog information, this would not
change the fact that disclosure does not change consumers' behavior).
65 The company Javacool Software offers a version of its "EULAlyzer" software for free.
Alexa, a site that measures Internet traffic, reports that its traffic rank is currently 78,085, thus
indicating very few monthly visits. See Alexa Internet, Inc, JavacoolSoftware.com, online at
http://www.alexa.com/siteinfoljavacoolsoftware.com# (visited Oct 16, 2010). For a manufacturer
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Simplifying and standardizing the presentation format of con-
tracts would likely be helpful. This might change consumers' expecta-
tions about the costs of reading contracts and might induce them to
read more, although one should be realistic about the actual magni-
tude of any increase in readership. Alternatively, a brief, standardized
label summarizing the key provisions on or near the product descrip-
tion page-in a manner similar to food nutrition labels-could only be
helpful.6 Perhaps consumers could come to rely on standardized letter
grades for contracts that have been approved by a credible and inde-
pendent third party.' But again, each one of these changes would be
costly to implement and should not be formally proposed by the au-
thorities without evidence that these costs are outweighed by benefits.
Studies like the one in this Article represent one approach to measur-
ing the efficacy of alternative policy proposals.
It could also be the case that, in some cases, buyers would almost
never find it worthwhile to become informed about terms. Given the
low probability that an onerous term such as a forum selection clause
will be triggered, consumers might be best served by becoming in-
formed about EULAs only after an adverse event occurs.' It might
then be helpful to consider easing consumers' abilities to seek redress
ex post, as the threat of litigation can also discipline sellers into offering
reasonable terms. Possible solutions would be to facilitate access to
small claims courts and reconsider the desirability of forum selection
clauses and class action waivers. The Principles indeed introduce
some mandatory clauses in this context.
description and copy of the EULAlyzer, see Javacool Software, EULAlyzer Personal, online at
http://www.javacoolsoftware.comleulalyzer.html (visited Oct 22, 2010).
66 The FTC has mandated standardized labeling in a variety of contexts. Examples include
the Appliance Labeling Rule, the Fuel Ratings Rule, and the R-value Rule. See FTC, Appliance
Labeling Rule, 72 Fed Reg 49948, 49948-49 (2007) (amending 16 CFR § 305); FTC, Automotive
Fuel Ratings, 73 Fed Reg 40154, 40159 (2008) (amending 16 CFR § 306); FTC, Labeling and
Advertising of Home Insulation: Trade Regulation Rule, 70 Fed Reg 31258, 31274 (2005) ("R-
value Rule") (amending 16 CFR § 460). Another example of standardized disclosure is the
"Schumer Box," which requires that certain credit cards terms be disclosed in a summarized and
standardized fashion. See Elizabeth Renuart and Diane E. Thompson, The Truth, the Whole
Truth, and Nothing but the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 Yale J Reg 181,
217-21 (2008). See also Clayton P. Gillette, Preapproved Boilerplate, in Omri Ben-Shahar, ed,
Boilerplate: The Foundation of Market Contracts 95, 97-104 (Cambridge 2007) (arguing that
government standardization of contract terms is undesirable because agencies are poorly
equipped to create good terms); Oren Bar-Gill and Oliver Board, Rethinking Disclosure, or
Product Use Information and the Limits of Voluntary Disclosure *16-26 (unpublished manu-
script, 2010) (on file with author).
67 This was proposed by Ben-Shahar, 5 Eur Rev Cont L at 22-25 (cited in note 13) (arguing
that user-friendly metrics of product quality have been successful elsewhere and could be tried for
contract terms, but conceding that there is not an obvious methodology to generate the rating).
68 See Shmuel I. Becher and Tal Z. Zarsky, E-contract Doctrine 2.0: Standard Form Con-
tracting in the Age of Online User Participation, 14 Mich Telecom & Tech L Rev 303, 320 (2008).
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Such an approach moves closer to direct regulation of terms,
however, which is always uncomfortable because the regulator is put
in a difficult and paternalistic position. It is hard enough to determine
optimal licensing terms in any one transaction but even harder to cod-
ify guidelines that would be beneficial in a broad majority of cases.
Disclosure and suitable modifications of contract format may be steps
in the right direction, but we must be realistic about whether the like-
lihood that even a well-designed combination of changes along these
lines would ever be able to raise the level of awareness of EULA
terms to a meaningful fraction. Before adopting this approach, we
must move beyond anecdote and learn more about the extent to
which terms now on offer are detrimental to consumer welfare.'
69 For a further discussion of consumer welfare, see Florencia Marotta-Wurgier, What's in
a Standard Form Contract? An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements, 4 J Empiri-
cal Legal Stud 677, 680 (2007) (noting that most EULAs are seller-biased relative to the buyer-
friendly default rules of UCC Article 2).
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